by Nik Bredholt, Laura Donkin and Caroline Muthiga
Famine and drought pose a regular threat in Eritrea, along with the rest of the Horn of Africa. Consecutive years of drought, high food prices and the global economic downturn all suggest that hunger and malnutrition levels are high. However, unlike in neighbouring countries no reliable national nutrition statistics are available to show this. There have been no comprehensive nutrition surveys since 2005, and World Food Programme (WFP) general food distributions have been suspended since 2006. The activities of international NGOs are restricted.
In August 2008, CAFOD was alerted to a poor rainy season by its local partner in Eritrea, and warned that the deteriorating nutritional situation in 2008 would continue to worsen until the next harvest in November 2009. Unable to conduct a nutrition survey or obtain statistics from others, CAFOD was faced with the question of how to justify a response in the absence of reliable data. Knowing that humanitarian capacity was severely limited and that general food distributions would not be allowed, the agency nonetheless decided to establish a supplementary feeding programme.
This article explains the challenges of operating in an environment where there are no statistics, and how the resulting programme provided CAFOD with a clearer understanding of the context and supporting evidence of the nutrition situation in Eritrea.
Using the evidence available
The evidence that is available paints a dismal picture of the humanitarian situation in Eritrea. In 2008 the kremti rains failed, and as a result people harvested very little or nothing during October and November. A September 2008 forecast by the European Union’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) estimated 2008 cereal crop production at no more than 200,000 MT, barely 30% of the country’s total annual needs. The next main harvest will not be until October and November 2009. Access to water is very poor; only 32% of the population have access to a safe supply. Pastoral areas have also been badly affected due to the lack of pasture for livestock grazing.
Local food prices have escalated and Eritrea is top of the list of countries most vulnerable to high global prices. Commodity prices are very high, many food items are unavailable in the markets and the cost of livestock has dropped in relation to the price of grain. An estimated two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line, with rates as high as 80% in rural areas. Military mobilisation has depleted the productive labour force, leading to a reduction in the range of household earning opportunities and limiting the income of many households to that of a soldier’s salary, just $20 per month. With the traditional staple food, teff, costing around $8 a kilo, it is an impossible luxury for the majority of households. Even its cheaper replacement, sorghum, is $2 per kilo.
Government policy is another factor. General food distributions have been suspended to vulnerable groups in favour of food or cash for work. Access to food is tightly controlled. Farmers are required to give a certain proportion of their harvest to the government, and the government forbids the transport of food between regions. The harvest collected by the government is allocated to its fair price or rationing scheme, whereby each family is able to purchase a fixed quantity of basic food and fuel items at a lower price. The ration varies according to availability; the current quota for a family of five is 10kg of sorghum and 2.5 litres of oil. This supply is both insufficient and unreliable, but because people are unable to legally purchase more than the ration they are forced to buy what they can on the black market, at much higher prices.
The operating environment for humanitarian agencies in Eritrea remains unpredictable. Fuel is in short supply and therefore rationed. Vehicles require permits to travel. It is difficult for international staff to get work permits. NGOs are unable to import food items, including oil. If imports are possible an import tax of 18.5% must be paid. NGO operations have been reduced, with the suspension of some programmes and the closure of others; 32 international agencies have withdrawn from Eritrea, and only five remain. UNICEF and WHO are the only international actors managing nutrition programmes in Eritrea (these programmes are implemented by the Ministry of Health).
Under these conditions, it is reasonable to expect that nutrition is severely affected, particularly among the most vulnerable groups. In February 2009, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reported that 2 million Eritreans required food aid, and that an estimated 75% of the population was vulnerable to inadequate nutrition. According to UNICEF, malnutrition underpins over 60% of under-five mortality in the country, with acute respiratory infections and diarrhoea the main causes. Malnutrition among women of childbearing age is put at 38% nationally, and 53% in the most drought-affected regions. According to a recent UNICEF report, rates of acute malnutrition in Anseba and Gash Barka provinces were above 15%; by February 2009, admission rates to therapeutic feeding centres were already two to six times higher than in 2008. Although comprehensive data is not available for 2009, food prices have risen, the harvest has been poor and the political and economic context has not improved. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the nutrition situation has not got any better either.
The supplementary feeding project
On the basis of this analysis of the food crisis, the challenges of the operating environment and available funding, CAFOD decided to initiate a three-month pilot supplementary feeding programme (SFP) from November 2008 to January 2009. It was hoped that this pilot would demonstrate that CAFOD could operate effectively and enable the gathering of information to present a case to donors for a larger, longer SFP.
The pilot project was supported by the Ministry of Health and local government authorities. It was implemented by local partners in Barentu, Debub, Northern Red Sea and Anseba Regions, through 22 distribution sites in villages and health clinics. The project provided a monthly supplementary food ration to nearly 7,000 moderately malnourished children under five, approximately 3,000 malnourished pregnant women in their third trimester and malnourished lactating mothers of babies up to six months. Beneficiaries received 9kg of supplementary food (DMK) per month. DMK is similar in nutritional value to CSB or UNIMIX, and is produced in Eritrea. It is made from a cereal base (sorghum and millet), chickpeas, peanut paste and mineral mix. The ration would normally include oil, but as oil could not be imported or procured locally it was decided to increase the monthly ration from 7kg to 9kg in order to meet the recommended calorie intake, though it was recognised that the proportion of fat was too low.
Community screening
The local partners identified target areas based on consultation with the Ministry of Health at national and local level, UNICEF, local health services and community leaders. A quota system was used to determine the number of beneficiaries in each area. In the absence of a national nutrition survey, CAFOD recommended that field partners screened all children under five and pregnant and lactating mothers in each target area before the first distribution, to identify and register beneficiaries. The mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) of all children under five was taken; those under 13cm were weighed and measured. Those with a weight for height (WFH) measurement below 80% were admitted into the programme. Those below WFH 70% were classified as suffering from severe acute malnutrition and referred to therapeutic feeding centres. A MUAC measurement of under 23cm was used as the cut-off point for pregnant and lactating women.
Without a full nutrition survey, it was not possible to establish global or severe acute malnutrition rates. However, the village-based rapid screening, which covered 20,725 children, provided a clearer indication of the nutrition situation. In Anseba zone, of the 9,012 children screened 0.2% were severely malnourished and 20% moderately malnourished. At the start of the project, 517 severely malnourished children in Gash Barka Zone were registered, which is an extremely alarming figure. Although feedback and registration documents from staff suggested that this was correct, CAFOD had no access to the region to verify this.
Factors indicating a food crisis The supplementary feeding project targeted nearly 10,000 malnourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers. CAFOD conducted a review of the project in January 2009, and the agency continues to request feedback from partners. CAFOD believes that the following factors all point to a food crisis in the areas where the project was implemented. As far as we know, no other agencies are providing supplementary feeding in these areas.
• The SFP was carried out during the three months after the annual harvest period, which is when people usually have the best access to food. It was therefore likely that the food security situation would continue to deteriorate until the expected rains in July.
• During the review we found that, just a few months after the harvest, some households had already started to adopt coping mechanisms to deal with food shortages. These included selling family assets (mainly livestock), travelling long distances to harvest wild fruits and berries and reducing the frequency of meals and the amount of food consumed.
• During the three-month programme, high numbers of beneficiaries travelled long distances, some from areas outside the region of operation, to be registered in the SFP. In some areas, moderately malnourished children and mothers who met the admission criteria had to be turned away due to limited resources.
• The majority of severely malnourished children identified were unable to access therapeutic feeding services due partly to a shortage of services in certain areas, and practical constraints which prevented mothers from seeking medical care for their children. As these children were not receiving any treatment, the SFP had little choice but to admit them despite the fact that it could not provide adequate treatment.
• Analysis of the end of project data reveals low cure rates and a longer length of stay compared with other SFPs. At the end of the project a significant number of children and mothers were still moderately malnourished and in need of continued supplementary food rations. At the end of the SFP in January 2009 there were still 2,381 moderately malnourished and five severely malnourished children in Debub, and 1,786 and 234 respectively in Gash Barka. SFP distribution staff attribute this to the lack of additional food sources within the family and the sharing of the DMK ration. Feedback from beneficiaries confirmed that families had shared DMK as they had little or no access to other food sources. The data and beneficiary feedback indicate that beneficiaries were using DMK as their main food source, rather than as a food supplement.
• At least 50 more severely malnourished children were admitted to health centres between January and April 2009. In Debub zone, 98 severely malnourished children were identified in mid-March 2009, but clinics were unable to admit them due to a lack of TFC supplies. Based on our knowledge of the constraints communities face in accessing TFC services, we believe that many more severely malnourished children have not sought or received treatment.
• During the latest Vitamin A campaign, conducted in early May 2009 by the Ministry of Health, at least 8,486 moderately malnourished children were identified; they have no access to treatment.
Conclusion
CAFOD believes that a food crisis persists in its areas of operation in Eritrea. In the present situation, it is difficult to see how the food security situation can improve, even if rains are adequate. It is reasonable to assume that this may also be the case in other areas where data does not exist, as many of the causes of food shortages are nationwide and there are no other large-scale SFP programmes and no general food distributions. With general food distributions prohibited, there is a strong argument for continuing and expanding supplementary feeding programmes. CAFOD has secured funding to continue the project until April 2010 and is seeking further funds to increase its scale and duration. We believe that the learning and data from the supplementary feeding project itself provides a better overview of the nutrition situation and is a strong justification for further donor funding.
søndag den 25. oktober 2009
lørdag den 12. september 2009
CAFOD and the Catholic Church in the mission
By Nik Bredholt, prepared based on discussions with Matthew Wingate and
Lesley-Ann Knight
Changes in the wider Catholic environment of the dioceses that we support might change
the role of CAFOD. To what extend can an agency like CAFOD be seen to sustain the
Church?
Since the 1970s, there has been a development within the Catholic Church in the missionary
areas of the Global South to become more indigenous and leave the leadership to local
clergy rather than having the white missionaries as Bishops. This has led to a situation
where nearly all newly ordained Bishops are locals. At the same time and parallel to this, the
Catholic Church has created more dioceses in an attempt to create manageable areas that
could be overseen by one Bishop.
When missionaries’ leave, they have often left behind huge structures with schools, health
clinics, and social institutions that are managed by the Church, and that require funds.
Where the missionaries usually had a funding source in their homeland or within the order
they belonged to, frequently the local Bishops don’t have the same links. The situation in
many dioceses in Kenya is that they used to have close relations to Italian, Dutch or Spanish
dioceses and supporter groups, and although many of these might have kept some
connection, the relationship changes when the Bishop changes from a European origin to
local origin. This development inevitably leads to financial challenges for the dioceses. With
more and smaller dioceses in which each Bishop is trying to establish and maintain full
diocesan structures, the funding requirements are put under further strain.
Another element that changes when missionaries leave is the expertise in sectors other than
theology that these people brought into the communities where they lived. It must be
recognised that long before the concept of a development worker or an aid-worker became
common, religious sisters and male missionaries performed tasks with similar ends, and
often to a high standard. The “old time” missionaries were often the best partners for
external groups like CAFOD that wanted to support activities in the diocese, and the
missionaries themselves were cheap project staff, who could speak the local language and
stay for extended periods in environments that we would describe as tough.
All these developments are internal Church question and not CAFOD’s basic
business. However, it is a cause for reflection, as we are also stakeholders and partners of
these dioceses, and our involvement cannot be seen in isolation from the wider Church
perspective. We bring in resources to the development and humanitarian projects and
although the funds come in through the development office, it is still an integrated part of the
diocese and the Bishop is expected to also oversee these activities. In many ways, we
provide the funds that used to come from the European constituencies that the Bishops or
Missionaries belonged to. Whether or not we pay all the costs that others did before, it
remains that with less funding coming overall from other sources, CAFOD and other Catholic
agencies become important partners for the dioceses and indeed more essential for the very
sustainability of the local Church.
As to the actual work that we do, we might end up doing the job the missionaries did outside
their direct pastoral functions, and we will do it at a much higher salary and not stay as long.
Where the missionaries had a holistic approach to evangelisation that often encompassed
bringing Christianity and practical support to the communities they worked in at the same
time, CAFOD pretends to have a clear distinction between the two, which is based in part on
the humanitarian principles that we strive to uphold e.g. the Red Cross and NGO Code of
Conduct.
It is a question however, how clear that distinction is, and whether we tend to overlook the
importance we have in a diocese, when we focus narrowly on the work that we want them to
do.
CAFOD is a signatory to the NGO Code of Conduct (CoC), which spells out that aid shall
be given according to need alone not any other criteria e.g. religious affiliation, and that no
conditionality can be put on the receiver of aid. However, the CoC does not restrict CAFOD
from sustaining the Church if that is what we want, but it is another activity or a side effect of
the humanitarian assistance we give.
On the CoC and the Church, we also need to be aware that with a local Church with an
indigenous leadership, the Church will inevitably have local agendas. In Africa this means
some involvement in local politics and that tribal issues play a role. This cannot but cause
some frustration, as we would like to see the partner as totally impartial. However, such links
to local circumstances comes with whichever local organisation we would approach if we
truly want to be working with locally rooted structures.
CAFOD needs to be aware of the importance we might play in the life of a diocese and
the side effects this might have. We have chosen to work in a particular environment, but we
should do it with open eyes.
The following short anecdotal conversation reveals the dilemma. Father Tobolino is now
retired and above 80. He lived many years among the Gabra community in Northern Kenya
where he learned about their language and culture, and wrote several books about this tribe
and their way to Christianity. His books are remarkable for the in-depth understanding of the
culture and he has produced what is probably the best dictionary for the Gabra language.
The assistant development coordinator in Isiolo who comes from North Horr where Father
Tabolino lived, overhead a conversation between a local youth and a new African priest who
has come to replace Father Tabolino: “Why do you only bring us the bible? Father Tabolino
always came with other books also”.
Today, CAFOD brings in some capacity to North Horr although we cannot in any way
replace what Father Tabolino did. We also make sure that the Diocese of Marsabit has
resources for the work that it does among the poor in these dry areas of Kenya. Are we
knowingly or not, replacing such missionaries?
Lesley-Ann Knight
Changes in the wider Catholic environment of the dioceses that we support might change
the role of CAFOD. To what extend can an agency like CAFOD be seen to sustain the
Church?
Since the 1970s, there has been a development within the Catholic Church in the missionary
areas of the Global South to become more indigenous and leave the leadership to local
clergy rather than having the white missionaries as Bishops. This has led to a situation
where nearly all newly ordained Bishops are locals. At the same time and parallel to this, the
Catholic Church has created more dioceses in an attempt to create manageable areas that
could be overseen by one Bishop.
When missionaries’ leave, they have often left behind huge structures with schools, health
clinics, and social institutions that are managed by the Church, and that require funds.
Where the missionaries usually had a funding source in their homeland or within the order
they belonged to, frequently the local Bishops don’t have the same links. The situation in
many dioceses in Kenya is that they used to have close relations to Italian, Dutch or Spanish
dioceses and supporter groups, and although many of these might have kept some
connection, the relationship changes when the Bishop changes from a European origin to
local origin. This development inevitably leads to financial challenges for the dioceses. With
more and smaller dioceses in which each Bishop is trying to establish and maintain full
diocesan structures, the funding requirements are put under further strain.
Another element that changes when missionaries leave is the expertise in sectors other than
theology that these people brought into the communities where they lived. It must be
recognised that long before the concept of a development worker or an aid-worker became
common, religious sisters and male missionaries performed tasks with similar ends, and
often to a high standard. The “old time” missionaries were often the best partners for
external groups like CAFOD that wanted to support activities in the diocese, and the
missionaries themselves were cheap project staff, who could speak the local language and
stay for extended periods in environments that we would describe as tough.
All these developments are internal Church question and not CAFOD’s basic
business. However, it is a cause for reflection, as we are also stakeholders and partners of
these dioceses, and our involvement cannot be seen in isolation from the wider Church
perspective. We bring in resources to the development and humanitarian projects and
although the funds come in through the development office, it is still an integrated part of the
diocese and the Bishop is expected to also oversee these activities. In many ways, we
provide the funds that used to come from the European constituencies that the Bishops or
Missionaries belonged to. Whether or not we pay all the costs that others did before, it
remains that with less funding coming overall from other sources, CAFOD and other Catholic
agencies become important partners for the dioceses and indeed more essential for the very
sustainability of the local Church.
As to the actual work that we do, we might end up doing the job the missionaries did outside
their direct pastoral functions, and we will do it at a much higher salary and not stay as long.
Where the missionaries had a holistic approach to evangelisation that often encompassed
bringing Christianity and practical support to the communities they worked in at the same
time, CAFOD pretends to have a clear distinction between the two, which is based in part on
the humanitarian principles that we strive to uphold e.g. the Red Cross and NGO Code of
Conduct.
It is a question however, how clear that distinction is, and whether we tend to overlook the
importance we have in a diocese, when we focus narrowly on the work that we want them to
do.
CAFOD is a signatory to the NGO Code of Conduct (CoC), which spells out that aid shall
be given according to need alone not any other criteria e.g. religious affiliation, and that no
conditionality can be put on the receiver of aid. However, the CoC does not restrict CAFOD
from sustaining the Church if that is what we want, but it is another activity or a side effect of
the humanitarian assistance we give.
On the CoC and the Church, we also need to be aware that with a local Church with an
indigenous leadership, the Church will inevitably have local agendas. In Africa this means
some involvement in local politics and that tribal issues play a role. This cannot but cause
some frustration, as we would like to see the partner as totally impartial. However, such links
to local circumstances comes with whichever local organisation we would approach if we
truly want to be working with locally rooted structures.
CAFOD needs to be aware of the importance we might play in the life of a diocese and
the side effects this might have. We have chosen to work in a particular environment, but we
should do it with open eyes.
The following short anecdotal conversation reveals the dilemma. Father Tobolino is now
retired and above 80. He lived many years among the Gabra community in Northern Kenya
where he learned about their language and culture, and wrote several books about this tribe
and their way to Christianity. His books are remarkable for the in-depth understanding of the
culture and he has produced what is probably the best dictionary for the Gabra language.
The assistant development coordinator in Isiolo who comes from North Horr where Father
Tabolino lived, overhead a conversation between a local youth and a new African priest who
has come to replace Father Tabolino: “Why do you only bring us the bible? Father Tabolino
always came with other books also”.
Today, CAFOD brings in some capacity to North Horr although we cannot in any way
replace what Father Tabolino did. We also make sure that the Diocese of Marsabit has
resources for the work that it does among the poor in these dry areas of Kenya. Are we
knowingly or not, replacing such missionaries?
fredag den 27. marts 2009
Stilfærdige amerikanere i Østafrika
Hvad bestiller amerikanske soldater i Østafrika? Kenya og Uganda er blevet mål for amerikanske soldaters besøg og selvom tilstedeværelsen er diskret, er de langt fra neutrale. Det fik to italienske nonner i det nordøstlige Kenya at føle, da de blev kidnappet af somaliere, som erstatning for to amerikanske soldater, som somalierne havde håbet på at finde.
Efter mange overvejelser og en del afvisninger besluttede den amerikanske hær i 2007 at placere sit hovedkvarter for en ny Afrika enhed – Africom - i Stuttgart i Tyskland. Der kunne ikke findes en løsning med et afrikansk land som også ville passe amerikanerne. På trods af de mange tusinde kilometers afstand til det mørke kontinent, har det dog ikke betydet, at Afrika går fri af soldaterne.
Karamoja regionen af Uganda er ikke et gæstfrit sted. På hotellet i Moroto, som er hovedbyen i den sydlige Karamoja provins, var der blandende gæster i starten af februar. Iblandt de mange NGO repræsentanter som den seneste fødevare krise har tiltrukket, var der også en gruppe forvoksede amerikanere, og et par enkelte i uniform. En gruppe amerikansk marine soldater kommer ikke tilfældigt forbi Moroto, og for en marinesoldat er der meget langt til vandet i Karamoja som er plaget af årtiers værste tørke.
Som i Graham Greens uforglemmelige roman, ”Den stilfærdige amerikaner” virkede de midaldrende soldater som om de ikke helt forstod, hvor det var de var landet, og slet ikke magtede kompleksiteten i situationen. Den næste morgen blev de hentet af soldater fra regeringshæren. Hvad er det præcist som amerikanere laver med hæren i Karamoja, hvor der reelt foregår en lav intensiv krig mod bevæbnede karamojong grupper? Bevæbnede karamojong er ikke terrorister som truer USA, men de kunne komme til det, hvis amerikanerne optræder som deres fjender.
Amerikanerne har offentligt erkendt, at de har støttet den Ugandiske hærs missionen i DR Congo mod Joseph Kony og hans hær, LRA (Lords Resistance Army). Missionen startede med et luftangreb på LRAs baser i DR Congo den 14. december 2008. Ved angrebet lykkedes det ikke at få ram på lederen af LRA og da tropperne begyndte deres tilbagetrækning den 15. marts var det småt med resultater som kunne præsenteres. Derimod har LRA siden angrebene startede dræbt over 1000 civile og fordrevet tusindvis både internt i DR Congo og inde i Sudan. Katastrofen indtræder, hvis LRA på grund af kampen beslutter at vende tilbage til det nordlige Uganda og fortsætte deres terror. Da vil det militære eventyr i DR Congo snare have forværret situationen end forbedret den, hvilket vil sætte spørgsmål ved alle parter i aktionen, inklusive amerikanerne. Lederne fra det nordlige Uganda var hele tiden imod aktionen og har konsekvent anbefalet en fredelig løsning.
Ugandas hær har givetvis brug for amerikanernes hjælp til logistik og efterretning, men er det i amerikanernes interesse at skabe en nær militær forbindelse til den siddende regering? Problemet er, at præsident Museveni har sin egen dagsorden, og hans demokratiske sindelag ikke strækker sig længere, end at han har omskrevet forfatningen så han kan få lov at stille op igen, og flere i hans nære familie indtager høje poster i det politiske liv og i det magtfulde militær, som han selv kommer ud af.
På den anden side af grænsen mod øst i Kenya, har regeringen holdt stand mod amerikanernes forsøg på at få et brohoved i Mombasa, men det har ikke forhindret, at amerikanske soldater bevæger sig rundt i landet.
Da to Italienske nonner i en grænseby til Somalia blev bortført den 9. november 2008, skabte det nogen furore. Nonnerne havde boet i El Wak i en årrække, og var afholdt af lokalsamfundet. Det nordøstlige Kenya er præget af konflikten i Somalia og udlændinge anbefales ikke at bevæge sig rundt uden væbnet eskorte, men den slags forhindrede ikke nonnerne i at leve helt åbent i El Wak til gavn for de lokale Somalierne.
Det viste sig senere, at en somalisk militsenhed havde været på jagt efter to amerikanske soldater, som de ikke fandt. I henhold til den Italienske avis, Corriere della sera, så fik amerikanerne et tip og forsvandt fra området i tide. Det gjorde nonnerne ikke og de kom derfor til at tilbringe et halvt år i fangenskab i Somalia. Først den 19. februar i år blev de frigivet efter den Italienske efterretningstjenestes mellemkomst og højst sandsynligt efter betaling af et ikke oplyst beløb.
Hvad amerikanske soldater laver i El Wak er uklart, men alt tyder på, at konflikten i Somalia er omdrejningspunktet. Amerikanerne har en længere erfaring fra indblanding i Somalia men med tvivlsomme resultater som den fejlslagne operation "genopretning af håbet" i Mogadishu i 1993 med al tydelighed viste.
Amerikanerne har inden for de seneste år flere gange bombet inde i Somalia med det formål at ramme terrorister. Hvorvidt bomberne rammer dem, de er tiltænkt, er uvist, men bomberne har skabt yderligere fjendskab iblandt Somalierne, og et trofæ af to amerikanske soldater ville kunne bruges som tegn på sejr for islamisterne og samtidig ydmyge Etiopierne, som med amerikanernes støttet invaderede det Centrale og Sydlige Somalia omkring nytår 2006/07. Nu har Etiopierne trukket sig ud af Somalia, hvilket burde give amerikanerne en tænkepause. Er den nuværende regering i Addis Abeba den rette at støtte militært? Som i Uganda er der er række interne væbnede konflikter som simrer i Etiopien, og den nuværende regering har ikke et anerkendt folkeligt mandat. Med den erfaring amerikanerne har for at vælge kontakter i Afrika, der senere viser sig problematiske, burde de være på vagt over for regimer, der mangler det demokratiske fundament.
Graham Green skrev sin bog før amerikanerne skabte ragnarok i Vietnam. Forhåbentlig kan amerikanerne stadig nå at undgå dette i Østafrika.
Efter mange overvejelser og en del afvisninger besluttede den amerikanske hær i 2007 at placere sit hovedkvarter for en ny Afrika enhed – Africom - i Stuttgart i Tyskland. Der kunne ikke findes en løsning med et afrikansk land som også ville passe amerikanerne. På trods af de mange tusinde kilometers afstand til det mørke kontinent, har det dog ikke betydet, at Afrika går fri af soldaterne.
Karamoja regionen af Uganda er ikke et gæstfrit sted. På hotellet i Moroto, som er hovedbyen i den sydlige Karamoja provins, var der blandende gæster i starten af februar. Iblandt de mange NGO repræsentanter som den seneste fødevare krise har tiltrukket, var der også en gruppe forvoksede amerikanere, og et par enkelte i uniform. En gruppe amerikansk marine soldater kommer ikke tilfældigt forbi Moroto, og for en marinesoldat er der meget langt til vandet i Karamoja som er plaget af årtiers værste tørke.
Som i Graham Greens uforglemmelige roman, ”Den stilfærdige amerikaner” virkede de midaldrende soldater som om de ikke helt forstod, hvor det var de var landet, og slet ikke magtede kompleksiteten i situationen. Den næste morgen blev de hentet af soldater fra regeringshæren. Hvad er det præcist som amerikanere laver med hæren i Karamoja, hvor der reelt foregår en lav intensiv krig mod bevæbnede karamojong grupper? Bevæbnede karamojong er ikke terrorister som truer USA, men de kunne komme til det, hvis amerikanerne optræder som deres fjender.
Amerikanerne har offentligt erkendt, at de har støttet den Ugandiske hærs missionen i DR Congo mod Joseph Kony og hans hær, LRA (Lords Resistance Army). Missionen startede med et luftangreb på LRAs baser i DR Congo den 14. december 2008. Ved angrebet lykkedes det ikke at få ram på lederen af LRA og da tropperne begyndte deres tilbagetrækning den 15. marts var det småt med resultater som kunne præsenteres. Derimod har LRA siden angrebene startede dræbt over 1000 civile og fordrevet tusindvis både internt i DR Congo og inde i Sudan. Katastrofen indtræder, hvis LRA på grund af kampen beslutter at vende tilbage til det nordlige Uganda og fortsætte deres terror. Da vil det militære eventyr i DR Congo snare have forværret situationen end forbedret den, hvilket vil sætte spørgsmål ved alle parter i aktionen, inklusive amerikanerne. Lederne fra det nordlige Uganda var hele tiden imod aktionen og har konsekvent anbefalet en fredelig løsning.
Ugandas hær har givetvis brug for amerikanernes hjælp til logistik og efterretning, men er det i amerikanernes interesse at skabe en nær militær forbindelse til den siddende regering? Problemet er, at præsident Museveni har sin egen dagsorden, og hans demokratiske sindelag ikke strækker sig længere, end at han har omskrevet forfatningen så han kan få lov at stille op igen, og flere i hans nære familie indtager høje poster i det politiske liv og i det magtfulde militær, som han selv kommer ud af.
På den anden side af grænsen mod øst i Kenya, har regeringen holdt stand mod amerikanernes forsøg på at få et brohoved i Mombasa, men det har ikke forhindret, at amerikanske soldater bevæger sig rundt i landet.
Da to Italienske nonner i en grænseby til Somalia blev bortført den 9. november 2008, skabte det nogen furore. Nonnerne havde boet i El Wak i en årrække, og var afholdt af lokalsamfundet. Det nordøstlige Kenya er præget af konflikten i Somalia og udlændinge anbefales ikke at bevæge sig rundt uden væbnet eskorte, men den slags forhindrede ikke nonnerne i at leve helt åbent i El Wak til gavn for de lokale Somalierne.
Det viste sig senere, at en somalisk militsenhed havde været på jagt efter to amerikanske soldater, som de ikke fandt. I henhold til den Italienske avis, Corriere della sera, så fik amerikanerne et tip og forsvandt fra området i tide. Det gjorde nonnerne ikke og de kom derfor til at tilbringe et halvt år i fangenskab i Somalia. Først den 19. februar i år blev de frigivet efter den Italienske efterretningstjenestes mellemkomst og højst sandsynligt efter betaling af et ikke oplyst beløb.
Hvad amerikanske soldater laver i El Wak er uklart, men alt tyder på, at konflikten i Somalia er omdrejningspunktet. Amerikanerne har en længere erfaring fra indblanding i Somalia men med tvivlsomme resultater som den fejlslagne operation "genopretning af håbet" i Mogadishu i 1993 med al tydelighed viste.
Amerikanerne har inden for de seneste år flere gange bombet inde i Somalia med det formål at ramme terrorister. Hvorvidt bomberne rammer dem, de er tiltænkt, er uvist, men bomberne har skabt yderligere fjendskab iblandt Somalierne, og et trofæ af to amerikanske soldater ville kunne bruges som tegn på sejr for islamisterne og samtidig ydmyge Etiopierne, som med amerikanernes støttet invaderede det Centrale og Sydlige Somalia omkring nytår 2006/07. Nu har Etiopierne trukket sig ud af Somalia, hvilket burde give amerikanerne en tænkepause. Er den nuværende regering i Addis Abeba den rette at støtte militært? Som i Uganda er der er række interne væbnede konflikter som simrer i Etiopien, og den nuværende regering har ikke et anerkendt folkeligt mandat. Med den erfaring amerikanerne har for at vælge kontakter i Afrika, der senere viser sig problematiske, burde de være på vagt over for regimer, der mangler det demokratiske fundament.
Graham Green skrev sin bog før amerikanerne skabte ragnarok i Vietnam. Forhåbentlig kan amerikanerne stadig nå at undgå dette i Østafrika.
lørdag den 3. januar 2009
Italiensk is på det Afrikanske Horn
På Asmaras hovedstrøg ligger undervisningsministeriet i det gamle Italienske fascistpartis palads. Et højt majestætisk frontparti, der imponerer beskueren, og klare flader i stærke farver. Skråt over for ligger Cinema Impero. Man kan stadig forestille sig, hvordan det har været for de Italienske kolonister at vandre op ad hovedgaden og tage sig en gelato på vejen sammen med en cafe expresso, for begge dele er stadig tilgængelige ved deres italienske navne, og i de originale bygninger fra 20’erne og 30’erne. Meget er forandret siden Englænderne maste sig op igennem kløften ved Keren i 1941, og afsluttede Mussolinis kolonidrømme, men Asmara står stadig som den blev bygget, endda ren og velpudset i stærk kontrast til andre afrikanske hovedstæder. Med Italiens exit blev Eritrea stort set glemt, og Asmara fik lov at stå. En militær paradeplads i enden af hovedgaden, hvor den tidligere togstation stod, er stort set eneste mindre om de mange års etiopiske overherredømme. Det er noget af en hemmelighed, at her på det Afrikanske Horn ligger en perle af en art deco by, men sådan er det desværre med Eritrea, der sjældent overskrifterne, og det er de på mange måder selv ude om.
Den tid er ovre, hvor Eritrea nød international goodwill i sine første år som selvstændig nation efter bruddet med Etiopien i 1995. Den Dansk ambassade har været lukket i flere år, ligesom praktisk talt alle ikke-regerings styrende organisationer én efter én har opgivet efter at regeringen har forhindret dem i at udføre deres arbejde. Nogen har fået konfiskeret deres udstyr som flere minerydningsorganisationer, og nogen har fået deres fødevarehjælp konfiskeret. Eritrea har lukket for friheden og erstattet håbet som selvstændigheden bragte med frygt og mistro. Landet egne borgere kan ikke rejse ud, og alle økonomiske transaktioner er kontrolleret af den allestedsnærværende stat.
Én af de sidste uafhængige bastioner i Eritrea er kirkerne. Ifølge en lov forordning fra 1995 skal kirkerne holde sig til forkyndelse, og må i princippet ikke gøre andet. Lov forordningen er ikke blevet fuldt implementeret, men den er ikke desto mindre stadig gældende.
I slutningen af maj måned blev den katolske kirkes udviklings- og nødhjælps sekretariat bedt om at forlade deres kontor. Da kontoret ikke selv flyttede, ankom militæret med lastbiler og konfiskerede bogstaveligt talt alt inventar og kørte det ud til et lager uden for Asmara. Det tog soldaterne 8 dage at tømme kontorerne. Computere fik medarbejderne dog tilladelse til at beholde.
Den virkelige begrundelse for at lukke kontoret er aldrig blevet klarlagt. Lokalerne benyttes ikke til noget i dag, men er bevogtet 24 timer med soldater fra hæren, og inventaret kan kun frigives, hvis kirken betaler for den transport, som de ikke selv bad om.
For selv kirkerne har haft en hård medfart. Den ortodokse kirke og det muslimske trossamfund er i praksis økonomisk afhængige af regeringen, hvor katolikkerne og den meget lille protestantiske kirke har holdt stand, men spørgsmålet er hvor længe.
I november måned i år fik fire katolske missionærer besked på, at de skulle rejse ud på trods af at de alle havde gyldige opholdstilladelser. Sidste år var der 13 missionærer, der fik samme besked. Der er nu meget få missionærer tilbage, som ikke har nået pensionsalderen og derfor tolereres. Fremmede missionærer må ikke arbejde i Eritrea, og missionærer fra Eritrea må ikke flytte ud af Eritrea for at arbejde.
Logikken bag regeringens politik synes at være at isolere kirken fra dens internationale netværk og gøre den økonomisk så svag at den må ty til regeringen for støtte.
Militærets mobilisering af alle over 18 år trækker de unge væk fra kirken (på samme måde som de trækkes væk fra produktive aktiviteter) og binder dem i årevis til militær tjeneste. Almindelige mennesker, som ikke har kontakter eller kan betale sig fri, er i praksis bundet til militæret indtil de er 50.
Kirkens skoler og klinikker er truet. En skole i Asab blev lukket i september og utallige gange har styret truet med at lukke alle. Skulle kirken miste sit netværk af undervisningsinstitutioner og sundhedsposter vil den samtidig miste en vigtig og central del af sit virke, men det Eritreanske samfund vil også miste de nok bedst kørende klinikker og skoler som findes i landet. Sidstnævnte faktor kan være medvirkende til at styret holder igen.
Krigen med Etiopien, 1998 – 2000, er det store sår der smerter landet og som styret bruger som forklaring på mobilisering af ungdommen og de mange restriktioner. Grænsespørgsmålet er også det emne, som kirken mener det internationale samfund burde hjælpe med til at løse.
En afslutning på den permanente krigstilstand ses som nøglen til at kunne frigive ressourcer, både menneskelige og økonomiske, for udvikling af det Eritreanske samfund, og samtidig åbne døren for landet, hvor Eritrea i dag er isoleret med en snæver kreds af dubiøse venner som Sudan, Libyen og Kina. Den internationale mægling har ført til et forslag om en ny grænse, som dog er blevet afvist af Etiopien. Normalt vil det internationale samfund presse den part som ikke anerkender et mæglingsforslag, men i tilfældet med Eritrea og Etiopien har verden holdt igen. Eritreanerne, også de regeringskritiske, er enige om, at Etiopien burde presses til at anerkende den nye grænsedragning, og at USA burde hjælpe, men har vendt et døvt øre til, da man har haft brug for Etiopien i krigen mod terror.
Her er en opgave for den kommende amerikanske præsident, Barak Obama. Med den forventede retræte af de etiopiske soldater fra Somalia og en ny præsident i Washington, burde det være muligt at kaste kortene på en ny måde til gavn for befolkningerne på det Afrikanske Horn.
Ligesom Eritrea stort set blev glemt af stormagterne efter krigen og gik så meget lidelse igennem, må landet ikke igen blive overset. Eritrea har meget at byde på og Italiensk is er én af nydelserne.
Den tid er ovre, hvor Eritrea nød international goodwill i sine første år som selvstændig nation efter bruddet med Etiopien i 1995. Den Dansk ambassade har været lukket i flere år, ligesom praktisk talt alle ikke-regerings styrende organisationer én efter én har opgivet efter at regeringen har forhindret dem i at udføre deres arbejde. Nogen har fået konfiskeret deres udstyr som flere minerydningsorganisationer, og nogen har fået deres fødevarehjælp konfiskeret. Eritrea har lukket for friheden og erstattet håbet som selvstændigheden bragte med frygt og mistro. Landet egne borgere kan ikke rejse ud, og alle økonomiske transaktioner er kontrolleret af den allestedsnærværende stat.
Én af de sidste uafhængige bastioner i Eritrea er kirkerne. Ifølge en lov forordning fra 1995 skal kirkerne holde sig til forkyndelse, og må i princippet ikke gøre andet. Lov forordningen er ikke blevet fuldt implementeret, men den er ikke desto mindre stadig gældende.
I slutningen af maj måned blev den katolske kirkes udviklings- og nødhjælps sekretariat bedt om at forlade deres kontor. Da kontoret ikke selv flyttede, ankom militæret med lastbiler og konfiskerede bogstaveligt talt alt inventar og kørte det ud til et lager uden for Asmara. Det tog soldaterne 8 dage at tømme kontorerne. Computere fik medarbejderne dog tilladelse til at beholde.
Den virkelige begrundelse for at lukke kontoret er aldrig blevet klarlagt. Lokalerne benyttes ikke til noget i dag, men er bevogtet 24 timer med soldater fra hæren, og inventaret kan kun frigives, hvis kirken betaler for den transport, som de ikke selv bad om.
For selv kirkerne har haft en hård medfart. Den ortodokse kirke og det muslimske trossamfund er i praksis økonomisk afhængige af regeringen, hvor katolikkerne og den meget lille protestantiske kirke har holdt stand, men spørgsmålet er hvor længe.
I november måned i år fik fire katolske missionærer besked på, at de skulle rejse ud på trods af at de alle havde gyldige opholdstilladelser. Sidste år var der 13 missionærer, der fik samme besked. Der er nu meget få missionærer tilbage, som ikke har nået pensionsalderen og derfor tolereres. Fremmede missionærer må ikke arbejde i Eritrea, og missionærer fra Eritrea må ikke flytte ud af Eritrea for at arbejde.
Logikken bag regeringens politik synes at være at isolere kirken fra dens internationale netværk og gøre den økonomisk så svag at den må ty til regeringen for støtte.
Militærets mobilisering af alle over 18 år trækker de unge væk fra kirken (på samme måde som de trækkes væk fra produktive aktiviteter) og binder dem i årevis til militær tjeneste. Almindelige mennesker, som ikke har kontakter eller kan betale sig fri, er i praksis bundet til militæret indtil de er 50.
Kirkens skoler og klinikker er truet. En skole i Asab blev lukket i september og utallige gange har styret truet med at lukke alle. Skulle kirken miste sit netværk af undervisningsinstitutioner og sundhedsposter vil den samtidig miste en vigtig og central del af sit virke, men det Eritreanske samfund vil også miste de nok bedst kørende klinikker og skoler som findes i landet. Sidstnævnte faktor kan være medvirkende til at styret holder igen.
Krigen med Etiopien, 1998 – 2000, er det store sår der smerter landet og som styret bruger som forklaring på mobilisering af ungdommen og de mange restriktioner. Grænsespørgsmålet er også det emne, som kirken mener det internationale samfund burde hjælpe med til at løse.
En afslutning på den permanente krigstilstand ses som nøglen til at kunne frigive ressourcer, både menneskelige og økonomiske, for udvikling af det Eritreanske samfund, og samtidig åbne døren for landet, hvor Eritrea i dag er isoleret med en snæver kreds af dubiøse venner som Sudan, Libyen og Kina. Den internationale mægling har ført til et forslag om en ny grænse, som dog er blevet afvist af Etiopien. Normalt vil det internationale samfund presse den part som ikke anerkender et mæglingsforslag, men i tilfældet med Eritrea og Etiopien har verden holdt igen. Eritreanerne, også de regeringskritiske, er enige om, at Etiopien burde presses til at anerkende den nye grænsedragning, og at USA burde hjælpe, men har vendt et døvt øre til, da man har haft brug for Etiopien i krigen mod terror.
Her er en opgave for den kommende amerikanske præsident, Barak Obama. Med den forventede retræte af de etiopiske soldater fra Somalia og en ny præsident i Washington, burde det være muligt at kaste kortene på en ny måde til gavn for befolkningerne på det Afrikanske Horn.
Ligesom Eritrea stort set blev glemt af stormagterne efter krigen og gik så meget lidelse igennem, må landet ikke igen blive overset. Eritrea har meget at byde på og Italiensk is er én af nydelserne.
mandag den 27. oktober 2008
Kan man forsvare at give hjælp til forbrydere, der ikke har overgivet sig?
Dilemmaer i humanitær bistand
En minister fra regeringen i Uganda, Tarsis Kabwegere, kritiserede den 30. september Caritas Uganda offentligt i avisen The New Vision. Han fik sagt, at Caritas Uganda skulle stoppe hjælpen til oprørsgruppen Lords Resistance Army (LRA) så de kom under pres for at underskrive en fredsaftale. Det nationale kontor for Caritas i Uganda var meget hurtigt ude med et dementi og klargjorde, at Caritas ikke hjælper LRA, og at den kontakt som organisationen har haft med LRA om overlevering af humanitær bistand var efter aftale med fredsforhandlingsteamet, der består af FN, regeringen i Syd Sudan, donorer, LRA og regeringen i Kampala, og at hjælpen blev afsluttet i april.
Man må nok undre sig over, hvad en humanitær organisation overhovedet laver med LRA og hvordan en NGO bliver medaktør i en kompliceret fredsproces? Dertil kommer det grundlæggende spørgsmål, om den humanitære bistand som LRA faktisk modtog, var støtte til oprørsgruppen så den kunne begå nye overgreb, eller var det støtte til fredsprocessen som nu er faldet fra hinanden?
Det hele startede tilbage i juli 2006, da forhandlingerne mellem LRA og regeringen i Uganda fik et gennembrud, og det blev aftalt, at LRA skulle trække sig ud af det nordlige Uganda og samles ved to øde punkter i Syd Sudan. For at få forhandlingerne i gang, og for at undgå, at LRA skulle begå nye overgreb blev det af fredsforhandlingsteamet besluttet, at LRA skulle ydes humanitær hjælp. Caritas Uganda blev ved den lejlighed udvalgt til at implementere hjælpen, da Caritas kunne accepteres af begge parter i konflikten, således også den regering som Minister Kabwegere repræsenterer. Hjælpen blev bl.a. støttet af Danida.
Den tidligere undersekretær i FN for humanitære anliggender, Jan Egeland, medtager i sin erindringsbog ”A billion lives” et helt kapitel dedikeret til det nordlige Uganda og særligt forholdet til LRA. Jan Egeland skriver, at ”Kun Caritas havde modet til at hjælpe, da vi spurgte FN og NGO’erne om at bringe mad, vand og sanitet for at opmuntre LRA til at komme til samlingspunkterne i det sydlige Sudan.”
Der må være en grund til at Jan Egeland medtager denne episode i sine erindringer, og det kan være fordi det ikke er almindeligt, at en NGO bliver bedt om at deltage i en fredsproces som Caritas Uganda gjorde det.
Hjælpen var fra starten kontroversiel og forbundet med store praktiske vanskeligheder at implementere. Bl.a. var sikkerhed et stort problem, da Sydsudan er hjemsted for at mangfoldighed af væbnede grupper, og de logistiske udfordringer enorme med et vejnet i Sydsudan som er næsten ikke-eksisterende. Etablering af kontakt med LRA blev konstant mistænkeliggjort af regeringen i Kampala, hvilket i realiteten gjorde det umuligt at implementere projektet i det ene af de to områder tæt på grænsen til Uganda, da LRA konstant følte, at regeringshæren var for tæt på.
Dertil kom de mere principielle spørgsmål. At drive nødhjælp kan i praksis være en balancegang mellem flere udfordringer; både humanitære og politiske, men der er dog visse grundlæggende regelsæt som god nødhjælp bør fungere inden for som f.eks. The Sphere Project, Code of Conduct for humanitære organisationer og International Humanitær Lov. Hvad angår krigsførende partner påpeger Sphere, at der skal skelnes mellem væbnede grupper og civile, og den Internationale Humanitære Lov klargør, at en væbnet gruppe kan være berettiget til hjælp, hvis medlemmerne af gruppen ikke længere deltager i offensive handlinger, og hjælpen udelukkende er humanitær. Dertil kommer, at retten til det humanitære initiativ er beskyttet i International Humanitær Lov så længe den organisation, der yder støtten er både humanitær og upartisk. Med en upartisk organisation som Caritas og et LRA, der afstod fra nye overgreb, kunne hjælpen således forsvares.
Sidstnævnte forhold har dog været stærkt betvivlet. Selv hvis LRA ikke udførte nye angreb fortsatte den ufrivillige tilstedeværelse af kvinder og børn blandt LRAs rækker. LRA er kendt for at bortføre børn og tvinge dem til at deltage i kampen, enten som tvungne koner eller som soldater. Da Jan Egeland mødte lederen af LRA, Joseph Kony, i august 2006, var det netop spørgsmålet om frigivelse af bortførte, som diskussionen handlede om. Kony afviste ved den lejlighed at LRA holdt folk mod deres vilje.
Fredsprocessen har siden slutningen af april været i uføre. I maj blev der gjort et sidste forsøg på at nå Joseph Kony og få ham overbevist om, at han skulle underskrive, men uden held. Han mødte slet ikke op til mødet. Endnu et forsøg blev gjort i starten af september, men to dage før det planlagte møde gik kontakten til fredsforhandlingsteamet død. Siden da, har formodede LRA soldater angrebet en række landsbyer i grænseområdet mellem DR Congo og Sudan, og sendt stribe af civile på flugt i alle retninger. Tal fra UNHCR angiver at over 20.000 er på flugt fra området, og en del har fundet tilflugt i Yambio på den anden side af grænsen til Sudan, hvor en større hjælpeaktion pt. er i gang.
Den seneste bevægelse omkring LRA kan forklare Ministerens angreb på Caritas. Der er behov for at nogen må tage skylden for den fejlslagne fredsproces, og den er regeringen tydeligvis ikke rede til at påtage sig. Er det LRA, Kampala regeringen eller arrestordren på Joseph Kony fra den internationale domstol (ICC) som LRA har nævnt som det afgørende punkt, der har forhindret fred? Under alle omstændigheder kan det forhold, at LRA fik leveret mad og medicin for over et halvt år siden ikke forklare, hvorfor LRA igen begår overgreb.
Alle partner i konflikten er tabere. Den pest som LRA påførte samfundet i det nordlige Uganda er flyttet vestpå til DR Congo og det er nu helt uskyldige congolesere som bliver fordrevet og misbrugt som Archoli folket i det nordlige Uganda blev det igennem 20 år. Perspektiverne for hele regionen ved en manglende fredsaftale er uoverskuelige, og går langt ud over mad og medicin.
En minister fra regeringen i Uganda, Tarsis Kabwegere, kritiserede den 30. september Caritas Uganda offentligt i avisen The New Vision. Han fik sagt, at Caritas Uganda skulle stoppe hjælpen til oprørsgruppen Lords Resistance Army (LRA) så de kom under pres for at underskrive en fredsaftale. Det nationale kontor for Caritas i Uganda var meget hurtigt ude med et dementi og klargjorde, at Caritas ikke hjælper LRA, og at den kontakt som organisationen har haft med LRA om overlevering af humanitær bistand var efter aftale med fredsforhandlingsteamet, der består af FN, regeringen i Syd Sudan, donorer, LRA og regeringen i Kampala, og at hjælpen blev afsluttet i april.
Man må nok undre sig over, hvad en humanitær organisation overhovedet laver med LRA og hvordan en NGO bliver medaktør i en kompliceret fredsproces? Dertil kommer det grundlæggende spørgsmål, om den humanitære bistand som LRA faktisk modtog, var støtte til oprørsgruppen så den kunne begå nye overgreb, eller var det støtte til fredsprocessen som nu er faldet fra hinanden?
Det hele startede tilbage i juli 2006, da forhandlingerne mellem LRA og regeringen i Uganda fik et gennembrud, og det blev aftalt, at LRA skulle trække sig ud af det nordlige Uganda og samles ved to øde punkter i Syd Sudan. For at få forhandlingerne i gang, og for at undgå, at LRA skulle begå nye overgreb blev det af fredsforhandlingsteamet besluttet, at LRA skulle ydes humanitær hjælp. Caritas Uganda blev ved den lejlighed udvalgt til at implementere hjælpen, da Caritas kunne accepteres af begge parter i konflikten, således også den regering som Minister Kabwegere repræsenterer. Hjælpen blev bl.a. støttet af Danida.
Den tidligere undersekretær i FN for humanitære anliggender, Jan Egeland, medtager i sin erindringsbog ”A billion lives” et helt kapitel dedikeret til det nordlige Uganda og særligt forholdet til LRA. Jan Egeland skriver, at ”Kun Caritas havde modet til at hjælpe, da vi spurgte FN og NGO’erne om at bringe mad, vand og sanitet for at opmuntre LRA til at komme til samlingspunkterne i det sydlige Sudan.”
Der må være en grund til at Jan Egeland medtager denne episode i sine erindringer, og det kan være fordi det ikke er almindeligt, at en NGO bliver bedt om at deltage i en fredsproces som Caritas Uganda gjorde det.
Hjælpen var fra starten kontroversiel og forbundet med store praktiske vanskeligheder at implementere. Bl.a. var sikkerhed et stort problem, da Sydsudan er hjemsted for at mangfoldighed af væbnede grupper, og de logistiske udfordringer enorme med et vejnet i Sydsudan som er næsten ikke-eksisterende. Etablering af kontakt med LRA blev konstant mistænkeliggjort af regeringen i Kampala, hvilket i realiteten gjorde det umuligt at implementere projektet i det ene af de to områder tæt på grænsen til Uganda, da LRA konstant følte, at regeringshæren var for tæt på.
Dertil kom de mere principielle spørgsmål. At drive nødhjælp kan i praksis være en balancegang mellem flere udfordringer; både humanitære og politiske, men der er dog visse grundlæggende regelsæt som god nødhjælp bør fungere inden for som f.eks. The Sphere Project, Code of Conduct for humanitære organisationer og International Humanitær Lov. Hvad angår krigsførende partner påpeger Sphere, at der skal skelnes mellem væbnede grupper og civile, og den Internationale Humanitære Lov klargør, at en væbnet gruppe kan være berettiget til hjælp, hvis medlemmerne af gruppen ikke længere deltager i offensive handlinger, og hjælpen udelukkende er humanitær. Dertil kommer, at retten til det humanitære initiativ er beskyttet i International Humanitær Lov så længe den organisation, der yder støtten er både humanitær og upartisk. Med en upartisk organisation som Caritas og et LRA, der afstod fra nye overgreb, kunne hjælpen således forsvares.
Sidstnævnte forhold har dog været stærkt betvivlet. Selv hvis LRA ikke udførte nye angreb fortsatte den ufrivillige tilstedeværelse af kvinder og børn blandt LRAs rækker. LRA er kendt for at bortføre børn og tvinge dem til at deltage i kampen, enten som tvungne koner eller som soldater. Da Jan Egeland mødte lederen af LRA, Joseph Kony, i august 2006, var det netop spørgsmålet om frigivelse af bortførte, som diskussionen handlede om. Kony afviste ved den lejlighed at LRA holdt folk mod deres vilje.
Fredsprocessen har siden slutningen af april været i uføre. I maj blev der gjort et sidste forsøg på at nå Joseph Kony og få ham overbevist om, at han skulle underskrive, men uden held. Han mødte slet ikke op til mødet. Endnu et forsøg blev gjort i starten af september, men to dage før det planlagte møde gik kontakten til fredsforhandlingsteamet død. Siden da, har formodede LRA soldater angrebet en række landsbyer i grænseområdet mellem DR Congo og Sudan, og sendt stribe af civile på flugt i alle retninger. Tal fra UNHCR angiver at over 20.000 er på flugt fra området, og en del har fundet tilflugt i Yambio på den anden side af grænsen til Sudan, hvor en større hjælpeaktion pt. er i gang.
Den seneste bevægelse omkring LRA kan forklare Ministerens angreb på Caritas. Der er behov for at nogen må tage skylden for den fejlslagne fredsproces, og den er regeringen tydeligvis ikke rede til at påtage sig. Er det LRA, Kampala regeringen eller arrestordren på Joseph Kony fra den internationale domstol (ICC) som LRA har nævnt som det afgørende punkt, der har forhindret fred? Under alle omstændigheder kan det forhold, at LRA fik leveret mad og medicin for over et halvt år siden ikke forklare, hvorfor LRA igen begår overgreb.
Alle partner i konflikten er tabere. Den pest som LRA påførte samfundet i det nordlige Uganda er flyttet vestpå til DR Congo og det er nu helt uskyldige congolesere som bliver fordrevet og misbrugt som Archoli folket i det nordlige Uganda blev det igennem 20 år. Perspektiverne for hele regionen ved en manglende fredsaftale er uoverskuelige, og går langt ud over mad og medicin.
onsdag den 15. oktober 2008
Security for humanitarian organisations in the Kenya crisis
by Nik Bredholt and Steve Penny, IAWG
This article reflects on experiences in Kenya following the eruption of violence there in the wake of presidential elections on 27 December 2007. The crisis continued for two months until the announcement of an agreement between the two main political parties. However, insecurity persists, arising either directly or indirectly from the initial political crisis. Generally, the post-election crisis was fuelled by ‘old’ grievances that long predate the election, and will not be solved quickly.
The learning points presented here are based on the experiences of the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) Security Subgroup. The group, which was active throughout the crisis, comprises dedicated security officers and more general project staff from a number of international and local NGOs, the Red Cross Movement and representatives of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). The IAWG is an innovative structure in the NGO world, bringing together NGOs and UN agencies to work collaboratively to strengthen disaster preparedness in East and Central Africa. Although the IAWG has a regional remit, the Security Subgroup has limited its work to Kenya.
Background
The Security Subgroup started working on a template for a security contingency plan related to possible election violence in November 2007. This work was completed by the beginning of December, when the situation was still peaceful. The plan focused on expatriate staff with regard to relocation, hibernation and evacuation, but considered all staff (national and international) in terms of overall planning. The group started meeting in early January 2008, immediately after the crisis began. In the very tense days that followed meetings were held at least once a week and sometimes more. Some meetings had to take place in cafes or private houses as offices were closed and travel through certain parts of Nairobi was unwise. The following learning points and challenges emerged from this experience.
National staff are more vulnerable than expatriates
Most security plans are written with expatriate staff in mind. The security of national staff is very much a secondary consideration, and yet national staff were the very people most in danger in this crisis. Agencies in the Security Subgroup presented their approaches to issues such as temporary shelter arrangements and extra allowances for national staff, relocation plans and extra time off to accommodate family needs arising from insecurity. This served to establish a common view so that the different agencies took the same line on these delicate matters.
Many agencies preferred to conduct field operations using expatriate rather than national staff, as musungos (Kiswahili for ‘whites’) would not be perceived as implicated in the ethic conflict that was such an important element of the violence, and would generally be less vulnerable to harassment. Depending on their community of origin, national staff already in the field when the violence broke out either remained in place or were relocated.
Hope for the best – prepare for the worst
By setting up a template for an evacuation plan from Kenya to another country, for instance Tanzania, and a policy document for relocation, the group was able to provide all interested agencies with at least a minimum level of preparation. This was particularly important for smaller agencies that did not have dedicated security staff, as they could use the templates to make basic security preparations.
Whilst evacuation seemed an unlikely prospect in November, as the crisis escalated it soon became a very real possibility: some agencies evacuated non-essential staff and dependants, and the preparation of evacuation plans was a sensible and necessary provision. Although the security template prepared before the crisis identified what subsequently unfolded as the worst-case scenario, the impact of the crisis was more serious than expected. Agencies when writing contingency plans rarely act on the worst-worst case scenario.
Establish indicators and keep monitoring them
While drawing up a template for evacuation, it became clear that the group would need to establish and monitor indicators to create a basis on which to take informed, objective decisions. Colour-coded security levels of green, yellow and red were adopted, with the group agreeing on specific indicators that would suggest that the situation was changing from one category to another. Indicators included riots, political and social breakdown, regular and widespread armed conflict, increased checkpoints and security force operations, heightened tension throughout the country and in towns, civilian transport considerably reduced due to security concerns and international staff members restricted to major towns without clearance to move to the field. This was useful for NGOs based in Kenya, as the UNDSS security levels were not uniformly followed by NGOs before the crisis. Obviously, many agencies have their own sets of indicators, but in situations such as this it would make sense if a standardised set of security levels and indicators were used, to avoid confusion.
Involve UNDSS and local Kenyans
Soon after the crisis hit, the UN established cluster coordination for all major sectors. However, there is no cluster for security and it is unlikely that one will be established. Nonetheless, it is advisable to establish a strong relationship between non-UN agencies and UNDSS, ideally prior to any crisis arising. A senior UNDSS official made themselves available for many of the subgroup meetings, providing updates, analysis and advice. This input was extremely helpful. A small but not insignificant success was that, by the end of February, UNDSS had decided to share its sitreps with NGOs, via a list of those agencies that were well-established in Kenya and had been present at the subgroup’s meetings.
The Security Subgroup contained both Kenyan nationals and expatriates. The Kenyans were able to provide much deeper contextual analysis and historical background explaining the crisis in terms of politics, economics and ethnic rivalry, subtleties which expatriate members would not otherwise have fully comprehended.
Setting up an SMS network takes time
The subgroup worked on an SMS system, whereby breaking news could be distributed quickly and efficiently through short messages via the mobile telephone network. While there was agreement about the usefulness of such a system very early on, it took a long time to set it up and get the hardware to work. The system had to be hosted (the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) eventually volunteered), and adequate hardware and software bought and installed. The system was only tested at the end of February, by which time the situation had started to improve. Any such system in the future should have clear standard operating procedures (SOPs) and, information often being sensitive, it should be made available only to a known, defined group of members.
Information-sharing is difficult in a volatile environment
Sharing information about incidents such as attacks on staff and damage to agency offices and vehicles requires a certain level of trust, and establishing this can be a huge challenge when participants keep changing. No two meetings had the same composition. In the end, the group decided that information could be shared between known agencies and in particular a pre-established list of names which would not change from meeting to meeting.
Security in the field varies significantly
The security situation in field locations varied greatly: some provinces were severely affected by violence, while others were not. In some locations, good coordination mechanisms were established, where security issues were discussed and common approaches agreed. One example of this was in western Kenya, where agencies engaged local youth groups to promote peace-building. Elsewhere, however, there was little inter-agency collaboration, and repeated calls to establish the UN cluster mechanism at provincial level were heeded too late or not at all. Agency personnel were often exposed to extreme threats when travelling to distribution sites, especially when aid organisations were seen to be assisting internally displaced people of different origin than the host community. Agencies had to resort to air evacuation of their staff on a number of occasions.
Nairobi: a huge expatriate community
Security contingency plans are often designed for small, contained field locations, for instance where a small team lives together in a compound. Nairobi, however, presents very different challenges. Many agencies have a huge presence, with regional offices and support offices for Somalia and Sudan, and many staff dispersed across the city. The large slums, estates and residential areas spread all over the city mean that Nairobi does not lend itself to easy evacuation route planning. This presents unique challenges in terms of hibernation and evacuation planning, reinforcing the need for adequate plans and preparations prior to any crisis. These plans should not only cover Nairobi and the suburbs, but also the operational environment in Kenya as a whole.
Conclusions
Each crisis is unique, and there will always be shortcomings as we cannot plan for all eventualities. However, it is important that at the least minimal plans and guidelines are prepared in advance, including security indicators, evacuation and hibernation plans and clearly established methods of communication. Such plans should be communicated to and understood by all relevant staff. In fact, while many agencies in ‘Nairobbery’ had plans in place to deal with criminality and terrorist attacks, few had thought about election violence as Kenya, unlike other countries in the region, was generally regarded as politically stable.
Careful attention should be paid to the different risks to national as opposed to expatriate staff. The risks to nationals should not be underestimated and agencies should provide a forum for national staff to express their concerns. Individual agencies should also clearly understand their contractual obligations to staff on different (national, international, consulting) contracts.
This article reflects on experiences in Kenya following the eruption of violence there in the wake of presidential elections on 27 December 2007. The crisis continued for two months until the announcement of an agreement between the two main political parties. However, insecurity persists, arising either directly or indirectly from the initial political crisis. Generally, the post-election crisis was fuelled by ‘old’ grievances that long predate the election, and will not be solved quickly.
The learning points presented here are based on the experiences of the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) Security Subgroup. The group, which was active throughout the crisis, comprises dedicated security officers and more general project staff from a number of international and local NGOs, the Red Cross Movement and representatives of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). The IAWG is an innovative structure in the NGO world, bringing together NGOs and UN agencies to work collaboratively to strengthen disaster preparedness in East and Central Africa. Although the IAWG has a regional remit, the Security Subgroup has limited its work to Kenya.
Background
The Security Subgroup started working on a template for a security contingency plan related to possible election violence in November 2007. This work was completed by the beginning of December, when the situation was still peaceful. The plan focused on expatriate staff with regard to relocation, hibernation and evacuation, but considered all staff (national and international) in terms of overall planning. The group started meeting in early January 2008, immediately after the crisis began. In the very tense days that followed meetings were held at least once a week and sometimes more. Some meetings had to take place in cafes or private houses as offices were closed and travel through certain parts of Nairobi was unwise. The following learning points and challenges emerged from this experience.
National staff are more vulnerable than expatriates
Most security plans are written with expatriate staff in mind. The security of national staff is very much a secondary consideration, and yet national staff were the very people most in danger in this crisis. Agencies in the Security Subgroup presented their approaches to issues such as temporary shelter arrangements and extra allowances for national staff, relocation plans and extra time off to accommodate family needs arising from insecurity. This served to establish a common view so that the different agencies took the same line on these delicate matters.
Many agencies preferred to conduct field operations using expatriate rather than national staff, as musungos (Kiswahili for ‘whites’) would not be perceived as implicated in the ethic conflict that was such an important element of the violence, and would generally be less vulnerable to harassment. Depending on their community of origin, national staff already in the field when the violence broke out either remained in place or were relocated.
Hope for the best – prepare for the worst
By setting up a template for an evacuation plan from Kenya to another country, for instance Tanzania, and a policy document for relocation, the group was able to provide all interested agencies with at least a minimum level of preparation. This was particularly important for smaller agencies that did not have dedicated security staff, as they could use the templates to make basic security preparations.
Whilst evacuation seemed an unlikely prospect in November, as the crisis escalated it soon became a very real possibility: some agencies evacuated non-essential staff and dependants, and the preparation of evacuation plans was a sensible and necessary provision. Although the security template prepared before the crisis identified what subsequently unfolded as the worst-case scenario, the impact of the crisis was more serious than expected. Agencies when writing contingency plans rarely act on the worst-worst case scenario.
Establish indicators and keep monitoring them
While drawing up a template for evacuation, it became clear that the group would need to establish and monitor indicators to create a basis on which to take informed, objective decisions. Colour-coded security levels of green, yellow and red were adopted, with the group agreeing on specific indicators that would suggest that the situation was changing from one category to another. Indicators included riots, political and social breakdown, regular and widespread armed conflict, increased checkpoints and security force operations, heightened tension throughout the country and in towns, civilian transport considerably reduced due to security concerns and international staff members restricted to major towns without clearance to move to the field. This was useful for NGOs based in Kenya, as the UNDSS security levels were not uniformly followed by NGOs before the crisis. Obviously, many agencies have their own sets of indicators, but in situations such as this it would make sense if a standardised set of security levels and indicators were used, to avoid confusion.
Involve UNDSS and local Kenyans
Soon after the crisis hit, the UN established cluster coordination for all major sectors. However, there is no cluster for security and it is unlikely that one will be established. Nonetheless, it is advisable to establish a strong relationship between non-UN agencies and UNDSS, ideally prior to any crisis arising. A senior UNDSS official made themselves available for many of the subgroup meetings, providing updates, analysis and advice. This input was extremely helpful. A small but not insignificant success was that, by the end of February, UNDSS had decided to share its sitreps with NGOs, via a list of those agencies that were well-established in Kenya and had been present at the subgroup’s meetings.
The Security Subgroup contained both Kenyan nationals and expatriates. The Kenyans were able to provide much deeper contextual analysis and historical background explaining the crisis in terms of politics, economics and ethnic rivalry, subtleties which expatriate members would not otherwise have fully comprehended.
Setting up an SMS network takes time
The subgroup worked on an SMS system, whereby breaking news could be distributed quickly and efficiently through short messages via the mobile telephone network. While there was agreement about the usefulness of such a system very early on, it took a long time to set it up and get the hardware to work. The system had to be hosted (the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) eventually volunteered), and adequate hardware and software bought and installed. The system was only tested at the end of February, by which time the situation had started to improve. Any such system in the future should have clear standard operating procedures (SOPs) and, information often being sensitive, it should be made available only to a known, defined group of members.
Information-sharing is difficult in a volatile environment
Sharing information about incidents such as attacks on staff and damage to agency offices and vehicles requires a certain level of trust, and establishing this can be a huge challenge when participants keep changing. No two meetings had the same composition. In the end, the group decided that information could be shared between known agencies and in particular a pre-established list of names which would not change from meeting to meeting.
Security in the field varies significantly
The security situation in field locations varied greatly: some provinces were severely affected by violence, while others were not. In some locations, good coordination mechanisms were established, where security issues were discussed and common approaches agreed. One example of this was in western Kenya, where agencies engaged local youth groups to promote peace-building. Elsewhere, however, there was little inter-agency collaboration, and repeated calls to establish the UN cluster mechanism at provincial level were heeded too late or not at all. Agency personnel were often exposed to extreme threats when travelling to distribution sites, especially when aid organisations were seen to be assisting internally displaced people of different origin than the host community. Agencies had to resort to air evacuation of their staff on a number of occasions.
Nairobi: a huge expatriate community
Security contingency plans are often designed for small, contained field locations, for instance where a small team lives together in a compound. Nairobi, however, presents very different challenges. Many agencies have a huge presence, with regional offices and support offices for Somalia and Sudan, and many staff dispersed across the city. The large slums, estates and residential areas spread all over the city mean that Nairobi does not lend itself to easy evacuation route planning. This presents unique challenges in terms of hibernation and evacuation planning, reinforcing the need for adequate plans and preparations prior to any crisis. These plans should not only cover Nairobi and the suburbs, but also the operational environment in Kenya as a whole.
Conclusions
Each crisis is unique, and there will always be shortcomings as we cannot plan for all eventualities. However, it is important that at the least minimal plans and guidelines are prepared in advance, including security indicators, evacuation and hibernation plans and clearly established methods of communication. Such plans should be communicated to and understood by all relevant staff. In fact, while many agencies in ‘Nairobbery’ had plans in place to deal with criminality and terrorist attacks, few had thought about election violence as Kenya, unlike other countries in the region, was generally regarded as politically stable.
Careful attention should be paid to the different risks to national as opposed to expatriate staff. The risks to nationals should not be underestimated and agencies should provide a forum for national staff to express their concerns. Individual agencies should also clearly understand their contractual obligations to staff on different (national, international, consulting) contracts.
onsdag den 23. juli 2008
Det vilde nord
Det nordlige Kenya adskiller sig vaesentligt fra resten af landet. Stoerstedelen er (halv)oerken. En stor del af befolkningen i disse toerre egne lever af deres kvaeg og dyrker ikke jorden. Mange er nomader, som flytter med deres dyr. Deres boliger er telte, som det kan ses pa billederne.
Den nordlige del af Kenya havde ikke de britiske koloniherrers interesse. Da Kenya blev selvstaendigt i 1963 fortsatte den kenyanske regering i briternes spor. Fokus var paa den sydlige, og mest frugtbare del af landet.
Frem til midten af 1980'erne blev visse dele af det nordlige Kenya betragtet som 'lukkede omraader.' Folk fra disse distrikter fik udstedt spcielle ID-kort, som de kunne bruge hvis de skulle soege om ydelser fra staten.
Den dag i dag er det stadig smaat med investeringer i det tyndt befolkede nord. Der er lang mellem asfaltvejene, naar man koerer nord for byen Isiolo, der ligger midt i Kenya og markerer overgangen til Nordkenya. Offentlige institutioner er det ogsaa sparsomt med. I visse omraader er det den dag i dag kirkerne, som staar for stoerstedelen af servicen til delokale.
Dog er der med dannelsen af den ny regeringoprettet et ministerium for det nordlige Kenya. Tiden vil vise, om det er nok til at skabe en udvikling, befolkningen i Nordkenya er blevet lovet gennem aartier.
Den nordlige del af Kenya havde ikke de britiske koloniherrers interesse. Da Kenya blev selvstaendigt i 1963 fortsatte den kenyanske regering i briternes spor. Fokus var paa den sydlige, og mest frugtbare del af landet.
Frem til midten af 1980'erne blev visse dele af det nordlige Kenya betragtet som 'lukkede omraader.' Folk fra disse distrikter fik udstedt spcielle ID-kort, som de kunne bruge hvis de skulle soege om ydelser fra staten.
Den dag i dag er det stadig smaat med investeringer i det tyndt befolkede nord. Der er lang mellem asfaltvejene, naar man koerer nord for byen Isiolo, der ligger midt i Kenya og markerer overgangen til Nordkenya. Offentlige institutioner er det ogsaa sparsomt med. I visse omraader er det den dag i dag kirkerne, som staar for stoerstedelen af servicen til delokale.
Dog er der med dannelsen af den ny regeringoprettet et ministerium for det nordlige Kenya. Tiden vil vise, om det er nok til at skabe en udvikling, befolkningen i Nordkenya er blevet lovet gennem aartier.
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